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VIRGINIA'S GAP BETWEEN PUNISHMENT AND
CULPABILITY: RE-EXAMINING SELF-DEFENSE LAW
AND BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME
"Truly humane societies are those ... that have decided to begin
the long march down the road toward the abolition of vio-
lence .... [and] every once in a while, stop along the way to take
stock, and then decide to continue.
INTRODUCTION
Our criminal justice system rests upon the fundamental notion
that a defendant's punishment will match her level of culpability.2
In other words, the defendant should be a "fair candidate for pun-
ishment."' Accordingly, when punishment outweighs culpability,
effectively over-punishing a defendant, the legitimacy of our crim-
inal justice system erodes because the system in which we have
bestowed our trust has not produced a fair candidate for punish-
ment. The intersection between Virginia's self-defense laws and
the realities surrounding domestic violence demonstrate this
over-punishment problem.
In general, Virginia's self-defense laws reflect society's en-
trenched belief that every person has the right to combat an ag-
1. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How
SOCIETY RESPONDS 15 (1989) [hereinafter WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE].
2. See Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
437, 445 (2005) ("Notice that we refer to the absence of culpability in cases in which a per-
son is not a fair candidate for punishment.. .. In contrast, in cases in which fault is at
issue, we talk not only about the absence of culpability, but also-on the positive side, so
to speak-about the varying degrees of culpability.").
3. Id.; see also Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Pol-
icy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2005) ("Herbert Wechsler, Paul Tappan, and Louis
Schwartz, ... developed the Model Penal Code ... [and] understood the Kantian argu-
ment that respect for offenders' moral autonomy requires that they be punished in propor-
tion to the seriousness of their crimes."). This comment recognizes that legal scholars dis-
agree as to the exact theory of punishment to be utilized, but despite such disagreement,
most are still interested in incorporating a theory of punishment that is fair; namely, a
punishment that is "politically legitimate, morally just, or otherwise institutionally neces-
sary." Marc 0. DeGirolami, Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 699, 706 (2012).
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gressor with proportional force and protect himself or herself ac-
cordingly.4 Thus, under a claim of self-defense, the law recognizes
that a defendant, confronted with imminent harm, is not neces-
sarily culpable. Yet, in Virginia, the criminal justice system fails
to fully recognize and embrace this connection between culpabil-
ity and punishment in the context of domestic abuse. In such cas-
es, the abuser is the clear aggressor, but the law may not permit
the victim to fight back, thus the law has effectively taken away
the victim's right to defend herself.
This comment argues that in order for Virginia's criminal jus-
tice system to properly punish women who kill their abusers, ef-
fectively restoring their right to self-defend when necessary, Vir-
ginia must make two fundamental changes to its self-defense
laws. First, Virginia's criminal justice system must advocate for
the admission of expert testimony relating to battered woman's
syndrome ("BWS").' This reform must be uniformly applied
throughout our court system. Second, as Virginia's self-defense
laws require both a reasonable fear and an overt act, the subjec-
tive standard for reasonable fear must also extend to the overt act
requirement. This comment explains the significance of these re-
forms against the current state of Virginia's self-defense laws. In
following these reforms, Virginia's courts will begin to appropri-
ately match the punishment for women who kill their abusers to
their culpability levels. As a result, a woman acting in self-
defense will be able to claim as much under Virginia law when
she defends herself against her abuser.
Part I provides a necessary background regarding BWS, name-
ly its classification, symptoms, and relevant history, allowing the
reader to better understand the need for legal reform in this area.
Part II explains BWS, specifically its conceptual underpinnings
and its associated symptoms. It will conclude with a brief exami-
nation of Dr. Lenore Walker's-the leading scholar on BWS-
critics. Part II explains Virginia's self-defense laws as currently
4. See Jeffrey M. Shawver, Note, Battered by Men, Bruised by Injustice: The Plight of
Women Who Fight Back and the Need for a Battered Women Defense in West Virginia, 110
W. VA. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2008).
5. Only a handful of circuit courts have permitted experts to testify regarding BWS.
See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Crim-
inal Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 75, 96-97 (1996). However, this comment advocates for
broader reform at the legislative and appellate court levels.
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enacted and introduces the reader to the gaps in coverage for vic-
tims of domestic abuse suffering from BWS. Part III argues that,
given what is known about BWS, Virginia's self-defense laws
must change. Part III proposes two reforms: (1) expert testimony
concerning BWS should be admissible to show the effects of BWS
on the defendant; and (2) because a woman suffering from BWS
perceives physical acts differently, the subjective standard for
reasonable fear must also apply to overt acts. In applying these
reforms, Virginia's courts will be better equipped to appropriately
determine culpability in cases where a woman has killed her
abuser. These reforms will fully incorporate society's valued no-
tion that self-defense is grounded in necessity and will restore the
balance between culpability and punishment.
I. UNDERSTANDING BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Researchers and psychologists define a battered woman as "a
woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do some-
thing he wants her to do without any concern for her rights."' A
psychological consequence of this abuse can include the develop-
ment of BWS. BWS is a psychological theory first proposed by Dr.
Lenore Walker ("Dr. Walker"), which aims to explain why some
women eventually kill their abusers rather than respond in less
extreme ways, such as leaving the abusive relationship.! Many
courts have allowed defendants to admit evidence of BWS under a
theory of self-defense, through expert testimony.' Virginia has not
followed suit.'
6. See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, at xv (1979) [hereinafter
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN]. This comment will employ Dr. Walker's definition of a
battered woman and battered woman's syndrome for the purpose of academic consistency.
The term "battered women" includes wives and women in any form of intimate relation-
ship with men. However, the author recognizes that violence between same-sex partners
and against male partners is equally problematic.
7. Id. at xvi-xvii.
8. See Parrish, supra note 5, at 83 ("Expert testimony on battering and its effects is
admissible, at least to some degree, or has been admitted without discussion .. . in each of
the 50 states and the District of Columbia. On the other hand, 18 states have also exclud-
ed expert testimony in some cases. . . .").
9. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. 338, 338 (1994) (Westmoreland County);
Marybeth H. Lenkevich, Admitting Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome in
Virginia Courts: How Peeples Changed Virginia Self-Defense Law, 6 WM. & MARY J.
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Today, many jurisdictions recognize BWS and have adopted
BWS as an umbrella term for all domestic-abuse-related disor-
ders."o Despite the fact that a minority of psychologists still de-
bate the most appropriate classification of and treatment for do-
mestic abuse victims, the majority of psychologists view BWS as
an appropriate categorization and an explanation of the psycho-
logical effects of domestic abuse." Importantly, while this com-
ment recognizes that some psychologists are critical of BWS, this
comment neither evaluates BWS's legitimacy as a psychological
theory nor compares it to other proposed theories. Rather, this
comment adheres to a strict legal analysis of BWS and follows the
language that many state legislatures have enacted, accepting
BWS as a legitimate disorder, and argues that such recognition
should extend to Virginia."
As previously mentioned, BWS explains the psychological im-
pact suffered by victims of domestic violence." A concept central
to BWS is "learned helplessness."1 4 In an abusive relationship, a
woman may learn that she cannot control the violent attacks be-
cause regardless of her behavior, her partner will continue to
abuse her physically andlor verbally." Consequently, believing
that she cannot predict the effects of her own behavior, the wom-
an adopts a new behavior seeking to maximize predictability. 1
Importantly, Dr. Walker concludes that learned helplessness
WOMEN & L. 297, 311-12 (1999).
10. See Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 141, 174-75 (1995).
11. For example, many state codes reference BWS specifically, despite continual psy-
chological debate over the disorder. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (LexisNexis
2010); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203 (2013). Such state codes refer to BWS despite an ab-
sence of recognition by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 278 (5th ed. 2010)
[hereinafter DSM-5] (suggesting that violence can lead to PTSD instead of explicitly rec-
ognizing BWS).
12. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (LexisNexis 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
1-203 (2013).
13. Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome: Empirical Findings, 1087
ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 142, 145, 147 (2006) [hereinafter Walker, Empirical Findings].
14. See PAULA NICOLSON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY: A CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVE 59 (2010).
15. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 1, at 50.
16. Id. at 50-51 ("[T]hey avoid responses-like escape, for instance-that launch them
into the unknown.").
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arises from the continual cycle of violence that emerges within an
abusive relationship."
This cycle of violence occurs in three stages: tension-building,
acute abuse, and forgiveness." First, during the tension-building
stage, the abuser commits minor abuse acts towards his victim."
The tension-building stage is followed by an acute battering
stage, whereby the abuser acts with brutal violence against his
partner.20 The acute battering stage is followed by the loving, res-
pite stage.2' During this stage, the abuser exhibits "calm and lov-
ing behavior" coupled with "pleas for forgiveness."22 Over time,
and following the repetition of these three stages, a woman who
may begin to develop BWS may also begin to exhibit its associat-
ed symptoms, including learned helplessness.2 '
Often, a woman suffering from BWS and exhibiting signs of
learned helplessness simultaneously exhibits passive behaviors,
but the co-existence of learned helplessness and passivity does
not mean that the two symptoms are one and the same.24 Im-
portantly, learned helplessness is not necessarily limited to pas-
sivity. The term "helplessness" mischaracterizes the learned be-
havior. Rather than learning helpless behaviors, the abuse victim
learns she is helpless to control the violence." Accordingly, in con-
trast to passive behaviors, some women's behaviors may seem ag-
gressive. Researchers have noted that the anxiety felt in anticipa-
tion of the next abusive attack causes some women to act out in
order to provoke an attack from her abuser thereby ending the
feelings of anxiety.26 For example, a woman may start a verbal
17. See Carol Jacobsen, Kammy Mizga & Lynn D'Orio, Battered Women, Homicide
Convictions, and Sentencing: The Case for Clemency, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 31, 38
(2007) [hereinafter Jacobsen et al.].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 69 (3d ed. 2009)
[hereinafter WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME].
25. Id. at 83-84.
26. See NICOLSON, supra note 14, at 58 ("If the period of tension gets too painful for
the woman to live with-and she has learned that she will be abused no matter what she
does-then she may allow an acute battering incident to occur in order to experience a re-
duction in anxiety and the loving contrition that occurs after the incident.") (citing
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 24, at 54-55) (internal quotation
2014] 331
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argument with her abuser despite knowing that such an argu-
ment will lead to a violent attack. In so doing, a woman can pre-
dict the violence through her own provocation. Beyond a woman's
efforts to regain predictability, she also learns to act in a manner
that will guarantee her survival. In regard to women who kill, Dr.
Walker has stated that instead of exhibiting passive behavior, a
battered woman may "reach for a gun ... because [she] cannot be
certain that any lesser action will really protect [her] from being
killed by the batterer.",7 Thus, both violent and passive behavior
can be symptomatic of learned helplessness." In the legal context,
this drive for predictability is critical to understanding how a
woman suffering from BWS experiences her situation because
although a jury may determine that her behavior was irrational
or unreasonable, in reality, her violent or passive behavior is in-
deed rational in a BWS context." She acts to regain predictability
and to ensure her survival within the abusive relationship.
In recent years, many psychologists have started to character-
ize BWS as a subcategory of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
("PTSD") and, indeed, the symptoms associated with both PTSD
and BWS help contextualize the BWS-supported defense."o Alt-
hough the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
("DSM-5") does not expressly recognize BWS, it does suggest that
domestic violence can lead to PTSD, stating, "PTSD in females
appears to be attributable to a greater likelihood of exposure to
traumatic events, such as rape, and other forms of interpersonal
violence.""1 Thus, while the DSM-5 does not address and cite BWS
by name, it does recognize that a violent relationship has psycho-
logical consequences on the victim that include the development
omitted).
27. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 24, at 14.
28. See, e.g., id.
29. See Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman's Syndrome Does Not Go Far
Enough: The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 141, 143-44 (1995).
See generally Conley v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 554, 563, 643 S.E.2d 131, 136 (2007)
(permitting a licensed social worker to testify as an expert regarding the victim's PTSD
diagnosis).
30. Walker, Empirical Findings, supra note 13, at 144. Dr. Walker argues that BWS
is a sub-category of PTSD, which "incorporates feminist, trauma, and biopsychosocial
models" that can explain the effects of domestic violence. Id.
31. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 278; see also Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syn-
drome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 327 (1992) (explain-
ing that BWS as a sub-category of PTSD "is a collection of thoughts, feelings, and actions
that logically follow a frightening experience that one expects could be repeated").
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of PTSD." In other words, domestic abuse can leave victims both
physically and psychologically injured. It should be noted that not
all psychologists favor a PTSD classification because they argue
that this classification has a very broad and diverse applicability
and consider this broad classification as a negative. Some critics
point out that a PTSD sub-classification "is not necessarily useful
because the 'effects of interpersonal violence vary substantially
from person to person."' Despite these criticisms, Dr. Walker ar-
gues that juries are better able to understand BWS when it is ex-
plained in terms of PTSD." Additionally, the symptoms of PTSD
and BWS overlap, further supporting the sub-classification of
BWS as a sub-category of PTSD."
For a psychologist to diagnose a woman with BWS, the woman
must show specific symptoms. Psychologists have grouped symp-
toms into two categories. First a woman must show signs of
PTSD, namely re-experiencing the event, numbing of responsive-
ness, and hyperarousal.17 A woman must also show BWS-specific
symptoms, which include difficulties with interpersonal relation-
ships, difficulties with body image/somatic concerns, and sexual
and intimacy problems. Importantly, these symptoms coincide
with the aforementioned three-stage cycle of abuse, in that a
woman may be more likely to exhibit a particular symptom dur-
ing a certain period within the cycle.
These symptoms are critical when examining a woman's behav-
ior in the context of a self-defense claim. For example, hyper-
arousal, also known as hypervigilance, may cause her to be more
alert to signals of danger.40 Therefore, she may perceive a physical
32. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 278.
33. NICOLSON, supra note 14, at 68.
34. Id. (quoting John Briere & Carol E. Jordan, Violence Against Women: Outcome
Complexity and Implications for Assessment and Treatment, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 1252, 1267 (2004)).
35. See Cheryl A. Terrance, Karyn M. Plumm & Katlin J. Rhyner, Expert Testimony
in Cases Involving Battered Women Who Kill: Going Beyond the Battered Woman Syn-
drome, 88 N.D. L. REV. 921, 937-38 (2012) [hereinafter Terrance et al.].
36. See DSM-5, supra note 11, at 271-76; Walker, Empirical Findings, supra note 13,
at 147.
37. Walker, Empirical Findings, supra note 13, at 147.
38. Id.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
40. Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered
Women's Self-Defense, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 175 (2004); see also Terrance et
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threat in her abuser's neutral conduct, while an outsider may
perceive the same conduct as harmless.4 1 Courts have recognized
the impact such hypervigilance may have on a defendant suffer-
ing from BWS. As an Oklahoma court stated, "the battered wom-
an develops a heightened sensitivity to any kinds of cues of dis-
tress .... [S]he is more acutely aware that a new or escalated
violent episode is about to occur."42 Another example is the exist-
ence of flashbacks, which can "magnif[y] the fear" and cause a
woman to "perceive [] each successive battering incident as more
dangerous. 43 Consequently, if that perception seems unreasona-
ble to a jury, it will undermine a woman's self-defense claim be-
cause a jury will be unaware of this magnified fear.44 As a result
the woman's fear may appear unreasonable and unprovoked.45 In
all, these symptoms reflect how a woman's behaviors and percep-
tions can appear unreasonable to a fact-finder who is uninformed
of the psychological symptoms of BWS.
Many state courts acknowledge that most jurors fail to ade-
quately understand the dynamics of an abusive relationship and
the impact that BWS has on the victim defendant's behavior
within that relationship.46 Often juries hold misconceptions about
battered women, including that women who remain in battering
relationships are free to leave their abusers at any time.4 ' There-
fore, given these misconceptions and the danger that they present
al., supra note 35, at 938 ("[T]he consistent heightened arousal, explicate[s] the sense of
constant threat and terror experienced even in the absence of direct confrontation with the
abuser.").
41. See Kinports, supra note 40, at 175.
42. Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). Notably, during this trial,
Dr. Walker provided expert testimony regarding BWS and its associated symptoms. Id.
43. InSul Kim, Art as a Catalyst for Social Capital: A Community Action Research
Study for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Its Implications for Cultural Policy 32 (2011)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University).
44. Terrance et al., supra note 35, at 930.
45. See State v. Haines, 860 N.E.2d 91, 97-98 (Ohio 2006). In reversing the circuit
court's denial of expert testimony regarding BWS, the court stated,
The expert evidence would counter any 'common sense' conclusions by the ju-
ry that if the beatings were really that bad the woman would have left her
husband much earlier. Popular misconceptions about battered women would
be put to rest, including the beliefs that the women are masochistic and enjoy
the beatings and that they intentionally provoke their husbands into fits of
rage.
Id.
46. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (N.J. 1984).
47. Id.
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to a woman claiming self-defense, courts have been willing to
admit expert testimony on BWS. In so doing, courts underscore
the value that such testimony can have on "dispell[ing] myths"
about domestic abuse.
Early on, critics targeted Dr. Walker's research. Specifically,
critics have highlighted her "flawed methodology," which relied
heavily on one-on-one interviews with battered women.49 Critics
believed that Dr. Walker's use of leading questions "render[ed]
the participants' responses suspect.""o Additionally, some legal
scholars have argued that battered women are not in a state of
learned helplessness." The critics point to the inconsistencies
that arise from the term learned helplessness, arguing that there
exists a "tension . .. between [the] image of battered women as
passive and the actual action of those relatively few battered
women who kill their batterers."" These criticisms misunder-
stand learned helplessness. As aforementioned, the term "help-
lessness" is a deceptive term because helplessness denotes pas-
sive behavior." Dr. Walker, however, has stated that learned
helplessness characterizes the learned behavior, which is driven
by a need to reclaim predictability; it does not mean learned pas-
sivity. 4 In other words, the woman learns that she is helpless to
control her situation. Often this learned behavior includes passiv-
ity, but passivity is not a symptom of BWS per se." Despite these
criticisms, many courts and state legislatures recognize BWS as a
legitimate psychological disorder and will admit expert testimony
relating to BWS on a case-by-case basis when relevant." Given
such widespread acceptance within the legal community, the
48. Stephanie Duiven, Battered Women and the Full Benefit of Self-Defense Laws, 12
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 107 (1997).
49. Terrance et al., supra note 35, at 938.
50. Id.
51. See Kinports, supra note 40, at 173. For a more complete summary of the range of
criticisms, see id. at 168-77.
52. Id. (quoting Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transi-
tion: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 29 (1989)).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
56. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 860 N.E.2d 91, 97-98 (Ohio 2006); State v. Kelly, 478
A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. 1984); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
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courts have clearly rejected the criticism described herein, in fa-
vor of the psychological research presented by Dr. Walker and her
colleagues.
In light of what researchers know about and what other state
courts have accepted regarding BWS, it becomes critical for Vir-
ginia courts to do the same. The following section discusses Vir-
ginia's current self-defense laws. Specifically, Part II examines
two elements of Virginia's self-defense laws that pose significant-
challenges to a defendant suffering from BWS who wants to as-
sert a self-defense claim.
II. VIRGINIA'S LIMITED SELF-DEFENSE LAWS
Virginia's self-defense law is grounded in necessity." As the
Supreme Court of Virginia has stated, "[i]f it reasonably appears
to a defendant that the danger exists, he has the right to defend
against it."" For the defendant to show that he had the right to
defend, Virginia courts require that the defendant show the pres-
ence of both his reasonable fear and an overt act by the victim." If
the defendant fails to demonstrate both elements in satisfaction
of his evidentiary burden, the court will not permit the affirma-
tive defense."
In Virginia, a defendant need not be completely free of fault to
make a claim of self-defense, but if he is at fault, that is, if he
started the fight, he must have abandoned the fight before resort-
ing to force.' Under a theory of excusable homicide, the defend-
ant, while previously at fault in provoking the attack, argues that
57. VA. PRAC. TRIAL HANDBOOK § 4:13 (2013 ed.) ("The law of self-defense is said to be
the law of necessity, meaning that a person may use such force as is necessary to defend
himself or herself from harm, but only so much as is necessary. The greater the apparent
danger is, the greater is the force which may be used in self-defense.").
58. McGhee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 560, 562, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978).
59. Commonwealth v. Cary, 271 Va. 87, 98-100, 623 S.E.2d 906, 912-13 (2006).
60. Id. at 103-04, 623 S.E.2d at 915-16.
61. McCoy v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 771, 776, 99 S.E. 644, 646 (1919) ("The rule
may be briefly stated thus: If the accused is in no fault whatever, but in the discharge of a
lawful act, he need not retreat, but may repel force by force, if need be, to the extent of
slaying his adversary. This is justifiable homicide in self-defense. But if a sudden fight is
brought on, without malice or intention, the accused, if in fault, must retreat as far as he
safely can, but, having done so and in good faith abandoned the fight, may kill his adver-
sary, if he cannot in any other way preserve his life or save himself from great bodily
harm.").
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he had since "abandon[ed] the fight and retreat[ed] before at-
tempting to repel the attack."6 2 Comparatively, under a theory of
justifiable homicide, a defendant need not retreat, but must
demonstrate that he did not provoke the attack.63 Therefore, even
a defendant's verbal provocation will bar a justifiable homicide
defense.6 4 Regardless of which theory of self-defense applies, the
defendant still carries the burden of proof and must demonstrate
specific elements to claim self-defense. The following sections
briefly discuss the elements relevant to this comment.
The first element of self-defense is a reasonable fear of death or
severe bodily injury." Importantly, Virginia law implicitly recog-
nizes a subjective standard when determining the existence of a
reasonable fear; a jury must evaluate a defendant's self-defense
claim "through the eyes of the person allegedly threatened."6 The
supreme court has previously held, "[a] defendant may always act
upon reasonable appearance of danger, and whether the danger is
reasonably apparent is always to be determined from the view-
point of the defendant at the time he acted."" Therefore, if the
fact-finder must evaluate the defendant's fear through her eyes,
the court must permit adequate means to allow for a deliberate
determination on this issue. Currently, as this comment argues,
the courts do not.
A. Under Virginia Law BWS Expert Testimony Is Inadmissible to
Establish the Defendant's Reasonable Fear
Although the standard for reasonable fear remains a subjective
standard, a defendant cannot admit certain expert testimony
about his individual perception. In a 1985 case, Stamper v. Com-
monwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "evidence of
a criminal defendant's mental state at the time of the offense is,
in the absence of an insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of
62. Lenkevich, supra note 9, at 302; see McCoy, 125 Va. at 776, 99 S.E. at 646.
63. Lynn v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 336, 350, 499 S.E.2d 1, 7-8 (1998), aff'd 257
Va. 239, 514 S.E.2d 147 (1999); see McCoy, 125 Va. at 776, 99 S.E. at 646.
64. See generally Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 197-99, 688 S.E.2d 244, 257-
59 (2010) (stating that the defendant could not claim self-defense because he was not
without fault).
65. McGhee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 560, 562, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978).
66. Craig v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 842, 844, 419 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1992).
67. McGhee, 219 Va. at 562, 248 S.E.2d at 810.
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guilt."" Courts have come to recognize this rule as the "Stamper
principle." Underlying the court's holding in Stamper was its be-
lief that "the state of the art in medicine and psychiatry is not
sufficiently stable and established to form the basis for determin-
ing criminal responsibility."" Additionally, the court reasoned
that the nature of many psychological or medical conditions exist
in varying gradations that are "too subtle and shifting.", As a re-
sult, the court refused (and continues to refuse) to admit expert
testimony opining on the defendant's mental state.
While the court continues to reaffirm the Stamper principle,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Peeples v. Commonwealth, al-
beit in dicta, hinted at the possible expansion of expert testimony
regarding the defendant's mental state." In Peeples, the defend-
ant wanted to offer expert testimony to show that "he was likely
to interpret social situations differently than most people, that he
had problems with impulse control, and that he was likely to
jump to conclusions. 72 Although the court applied the Stamper
principle and rejected the defendant's request, the court provided
significant insight into potential future divergence from this prin-
ciple." The court stated:
In this instance, the expert's opinion evidence was not relevant to
prove that the defendant acted to defend himself from a threat of
imminent bodily harm, or that he was provoked or acted in the heat
of passion. Though this is not to say that expert testimony is never
admissible in support of the defenses of heat of passion or self-
defense. 7 4
Given the court's language, there may exist a possibility that ex-
pert testimony may one day be considered relevant and therefore
admissible. This comment argues that such cases should include
68. 228 Va. 707, 717, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (1985).
69. Peeples v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 626, 631, 519 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1999) (re-
hearing en banc).
70. Id. at 631-32, 519 S.E.2d at 384-85.
71. Id. at 634, 519 S.E.2d at 385. See generally Lenkevich, supra note 9, at 318 (ana-
lyzing the effect of the Peeples decision on expert testimony and self-defense law in Virgin-
ia).
72. Peeples, 30 Va. App. at 633, 519 S.E.2d at 385.
73. Id. at 634, 519 S.E.2d at 385.
74. Id.
75. See generally Lenkevich, supra note 9, at 318 ('Virginia courts may now be open to
reevaluating the admissibility of BWS expert testimony when the mental state of the de-
fendant is at issue, even in the absence of an insanity defense.").
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instances when a victim of abuse kills her abuser because expert
testimony will be relevant to her belief that there existed a threat
of imminent bodily harm. Several circuit courts have admitted
expert testimony as it relates to BWS, however, uniform applica-
tion remains absent." Therefore, without more guidance from the
appellate courts, this comment advocates for broader legislative
reform in order to promote consistent application.
B. Virginia Self-Defense Laws Require an Overt Act by the Victim
to Make a Claim of Self-Defense
The second element necessary to establish a defense of self-
defense requires that the defendant demonstrate an overt act on
behalf of the victim." Fear alone is not enough to claim self-
defense." A defendant must show that his fear was responsive to
an overt act "indicative of imminent danger at the time."" The
Supreme Court of Virginia required an overt act as early as 1874,
stating that "[p]revious threats, or even acts of hostility, how vio-
lent soever, will not of themselves excuse the slayer, but there
must be some words or overt act at the time clearly indicating a
present purpose to do the injury."" The overt act is important be-
cause its existence evidences necessity." Whether the overt act
was factually life-threatening is irrelevant." As the court in Per-
kins v. Commonwealth stated, "[iut is true that the accused may
have misunderstood and feared [the victim's] motive and intent,
but bare fear of injury at the hands of another, in the absence of
some overt act indicative of imminent danger at that time, will
not justify the taking of human life."" Unlike the reasonable fear
standard, the subjective standard does not extend to overt acts.
76. Parrish, supra note 5, at 93-96.
77. Vlastaris v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 647, 651, 178 S.E. 775, 776 (1935).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 652, 178 S.E. at 776.
80. Stoneman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. 887, 898 (1874). "[I]t is said, although it is
lawful for one to deprive of life another meditating his life, yet he must wait till some overt
act is done in pursuance of the meditation. In other words, till the danger becomes immi-
nent." Id. at 896.
81. Viastaris, 164 Va. at 651, 178 S.E. at 776. ('The plea of self-defense is a plea of
necessity and the necessity must be shown to exist or there must be shown such reasona-
ble apprehension of the immediate danger, by some overt act, as to amount to the creation
of necessity.").
82. See Perkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 867, 873, 44 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1947).
83. Id.
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Rather, an overt act is a factual inquiry that does not incorporate
a defendant's experience or knowledge.
Despite Virginia courts' on-going fidelity to the traditional doc-
trine of self-defense and its aforementioned elements, this current
doctrine falls significantly short when applied to cases of domestic
violence. Because a jury can neither hear evidence of how BWS
impacts the defendant's reasonable fear, nor can it stray from
demanding an overt act, the defendant cannot meet the elements
for a self-defense claim. As a result, a jury or judge will be forced
to determine guilt without being fully informed. Part III proposes
two key reforms that aim to tailor self-defense laws to the partic-
ular challenges raised in cases of domestic abuse, thereby correct-
ly restoring the right to self-defend.
III. PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS TO VIRGINIA'S SELF-DEFENSE
LAWS
For Virginia courts to remain faithful to the fundamental no-
tion that a defendant acting in self-defense is not culpable, two
reforms must happen. The fact-finder must be allowed to hear ev-
idence of a victim defendant's BWS through expert testimony."
Additionally, the court must apply a subjective standard to the
overt act requirement. Part III discusses each of these reforms in
turn."
A. Expert Testimony Should Be Admitted to Show That the
Victim Defendant Suffers from BWS
Admitting expert testimony as it relates to BWS will provide
the victim defendant with a necessary opportunity to establish
the reasonable fear requirement as part of her self-defense claim.
Because self-defense requires a reasonable fear of imminent
damage and, as already mentioned, the fact finder will consider
the reasonable fear under a subjective standard, a victim defend-
84. Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 730, 553 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2001).
85. As previously mentioned, a handful of circuit courts have admitted expert testi-
mony related to BWS, accordingly, this comment advocates for legislative reform to pro-
mote uniform application. See supra Part I.
86. This section refers to the battered woman defendant as "victim defendant" and
abuser as "deceased."
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ant must have an effective and fair method of conveying what her
reasonable fear may be, given the existence of an abusive rela-
tionship." Expert testimony will be an effective method to prove a
reasonable fear because research has shown that the average
person does not understand the effects of domestic abuse, and,
therefore, cannot competently determine what a reasonable fear
may be without further edification." In other words, without ex-
pert testimony informing a fact-finder about how domestic abuse
can alter a victim's subjective perceptions of danger, a BWS-
afflicted defendant cannot adequately demonstrate to the average
person that she had a reasonable fear of death. Furthermore, ex-
pert testimony is also a fair method of proving that a reasonable
fear existed because both parties will be permitted to examine the
expert. Regardless, the fact-finder remains the ultimate evaluator
of the testimony. Importantly, not only will the individual de-
fendant benefit from this reform, but the legitimacy of the crimi-
nal justice system's will be strengthened because judgments will
be the product of fully informed deliberations and not simply de-
cisions based on commonly held misconceptions about domestic
abuse victims."
The following section outlines the scope of this reform proposal
and examines the need for expert testimony given commonly held
misconceptions regarding domestic abuse. It concludes by ad-
dressing possible criticisms, including the court's reasoning in
Stamper.
Currently, Virginia law allows defendants to admit relevant ev-
idence of abuse, but the court will not admit evidence of the ef-
fects of said abuse upon a victim defendant." Virginia Code sec-
87. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 1, at 53 ("Unless a jury is allowed to un-
derstand the bearing that learned behavior patterns have in determining the actions of
battered women [... ], they may find themselves at a loss in attempting to deliver a rea-
sonable and just verdict.").
88. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 379 n.15 (N.J. 1984) (acknowledging that BWS is
"beyond the understanding of the average person"); see also Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d
678, 683 (Ga. 1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981); Ibn-Tamas v. United
States, 407 A.2d 626, 655 (D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.2d 801, 807 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
89. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 379 n.15.
90. See Peeples v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 626, 630-31, 519 S.E.2d 382, 384
(1999); Lenkevich, supra note 9, at 311 ("The court system in Virginia has refused to allow
BWS expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental state to be considered by a jury in
either the guilt phase or the sentencing phase of a trial.").
2014] 341
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tion 19.2-270.6 states, "[i]n any criminal prosecution alleging per-
sonal injury or death, or the attempt to cause personal injury or
death, relevant evidence of repeated physical and psychological
abuse of the accused by the victim shall be admissible, subject to
the general rules of evidence."" Relatedly, while expert testimony
is permitted, it is limited to the "nature and extent of [the ex-
pert's] knowledge."92 This limitation aims to exclude expert testi-
mony involving the ultimate issue of fact.13 Here, the ultimate is-
sue of fact is whether the victim defendant held a reasonable fear
of death or bodily injury at the time of the offense. This com-
ment's reform proposal does not seek to disturb this limitation.
The scope of this proposed reform is limited. Experts should be
allowed to testify as to whether the victim defendant suffered or
is suffering from BWS as well as how BWS affects a woman's per-
ception as it relates to her reasonable fear of imminent harm.
This comment does not argue that experts should be allowed to
testify as to whether the defendant suffered a reasonable belief of
imminent harm at the time of the killing. This limitation leaves
the core of the Stamper principle intact, but addresses its harmful
rigidity. This reform essentially walks through the door that the
Peeples court opened." In allowing the victim defendant to admit
expert testimony relating to BWS, the jury will be better able to
determine the ultimate issue of fact, namely whether the victim
defendant had a reasonable fear of death or serious injury at the
time of the killing. In the end, the ultimate issue of fact will still
go to the jury. The expert's testimony will simply provide the nec-
essary information for the jury to then make its determination.
Admitting evidence of abuse under section 19.2-270.6 would be
sufficient for a victim defendant who is not suffering from BWS,
however given the specific symptoms and learned behavior asso-
ciated with BWS, section 19.2-270.6 is wholly insufficient for a
woman suffering from BWS claiming self-defense." The Virginia
Code's language and application effectively eliminate the subjec-
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.6 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
92. Landis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 797, 799, 241 S.E.2d 749, 750 (1978); see
Lenkevich, supra note 9, at 307.
93. See Freeman v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 301, 315, 288 S.E.2d 461, 468 (1982);
Lenkevich, supra note 9, at 307.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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tive standard for reasonable fear in cases involving defendants
suffering from BWS. Even if the court admits evidence of abuse,
the victim defendant must still show that she experienced a rea-
sonable fear. However, as Part I explained, a reasonable fear for a
woman suffering from BWS may not be the same fear that a fact-
finder not suffering from BWS envisions as reasonable.96 Accord-
ingly, admitting evidence under section 19.2-270.6, without more
information to provide context, may adversely affect the victim
defendant's self-defense claim." For example, the victim defend-
ant would likely be "attuned to her abuser's pattern of attacks,"
therefore, the deceased's subtle gestures or threats may signify
an imminent threat to the victim defendant that a "normal" per-
son would not perceive." In admitting evidence of abuse, the vic-
tim defendant may unintentionally invite the fact-finder to make
conclusions regarding her reasonable fear, which do not include
the fear she actually held at the time of the killing. Alternatively
stated, the fact-finder may find her fear to be unreasonable and
therefore find that she has not established a claim of self-defense.
This outcome frustrates the purpose of the subjective standard
because the fact-finder is no longer evaluating the victim defend-
ant's fear through her eyes, but is supplanting the defendant's
reasonable fear for the fact-finder's own reasonable fear. The fact-
finder's lack of understanding of BWS and misconceptions have
the practical effect of voiding the subjective standard for reasona-
ble fear. Without more evidence, the fact-finder, in essence, can-
not help but to ignore the law. Clearly, giving juries more rele-
vant evidence will allow them to better apply a subjective
standard to reasonable fear.
Fortunately, the legal system has already developed a mecha-
nism, i.e., expert testimony, that can bridge the jury's harmful
gap in understanding. The purpose of expert testimony is "to as-
sist triers of fact in those areas where a person of normal intelli-
gence and experience cannot make a competent decision."" Addi-
96. See supra Part I.
97. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.6 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
98. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1498, 1582 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses].
99. Swiney v. Overby, 237 Va. 231, 233, 377 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1989).
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tionally, expert testimony relating to BWS has been shown to be
extremely effective in instructing the fact-finder."'
Recently, researchers conducted a study involving mock jurors
and BWS evidence.o' Researchers gave the jurors actual case
summaries and relevant expert testimony.'0 2 Researchers deter-
mined that when juries were provided with expert testimony,
they were more likely to view the case as meeting the require-
ments of self-defense.o3 Furthermore, the mock jurors understood
that the victim defendant had "fewer options" available to her
and that the killing was justified.' 4 Clearly, and as this study
shows, women suffering from BWS do in fact have a self-defense
claim; however, in Virginia, the criminal justice system prohibits
such defendants from raising this claim by barring expert.
Although this study illustrates the necessity of expert testimo-
ny, the study also demonstrates the inherent dangers in creating
a stereotypical battered woman. A jury may replace previously
held misconceptions surrounding domestic violence with equally
misconceived expectations that a "real" battered woman must ad-
here to the specific symptoms of BWS.o' For example, one of the
study's findings was that mock jurors were more sympathetic to
the defendant when the evidence portrayed her as a "'typical' bat-
tered woman."'06 While this is a legitimate concern, it highlights
the need for defense attorneys to familiarize themselves with
BWS and to ensure that any testifying expert can effectively edu-
cate the jury. Even if the victim defendant's symptoms stray from
a perceived "classic" BWS diagnosis, having an expert on the
stand will provide attorneys with an adequate opportunity to elic-
it testimony regarding the nuances of BWS.
100. See Terrance et al., supra note 35, at 946.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. While this study supports exposing juries to expert testimony, the study
concluded that juries were inclined to support the defendant's position only when the evi-
dence demonstrated that the defendant victim was a "passive" victim. Id.
105. Id. One author has recently purported a solution that called for replacing BWS
testimony with social agency ("SA") testimony. Id. at 947-52. SA testimony does not "ex-
plain the responses of battered women within a syndrome-based discourse," rather SA tes-
timony seeks to offer an explanation couched in the "overall social context." Id. at 948.
106. Id. at 946.
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The need for the admissibility of expert testimony in cases in-
volving BWS is further bolstered by the case law in other states,
which recognize that the average person does not understand the
effects of domestic abuse.' 7 New Jersey was one of the first states
to recognize the need for expert testimony in cases alleging
BWS.o' In State v. Kelly, Kelly argued that expert testimony was
directly relevant to one of the critical elements of self-defense,
namely, that Kelly "believed at the time of the stabbing [of her
abuser husband] ... that she was in imminent danger of
death."' 9 The New Jersey court agreed and stated:
Some popular misconceptions about battered women include the be-
liefs that they are masochistic and actually enjoy their beatings, that
they purposely provoke their husbands into violent behavior, and,
most critically, as we shall soon see, that women who remain in bat-
tering relationships are free to leave their abusers at any time.no
Following Kelly, many state legislatures enacted laws that per-
mitted expert testimony in cases raising BWS."'
For example, the Ohio legislature has explicitly acknowledged
the existence of BWS, stating that "the syndrome currently is a
matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge.""' Yet, Ohio
law understands that this commonly accepted scientific
knowledge does not translate to public understanding. Ohio rec-
ognizes that the "general populace" is not sufficiently familiar
with BWS."' As a result:
107. See, e.g., State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1112 (Conn. 1993) ('[R]esearch data in-
dicates that potential jurors may hold beliefs and attitudes about abused women at vari-
ance with the views of experts who have studied or had experience with abused women. In
particular, males are likely to be skeptical about the fear the woman feels in an abusive
relationship and about her inability to leave a setting in which abuse is threatened.").
108. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) ("The combination of all these
symptoms-resulting from sustained psychological and physical trauma compounded by
aggravating social and economic factors-constitutes the battered-woman's syndrome. On-
ly by understanding these unique pressures that force battered women to remain with
their mates, despite their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the
isolation that being a battered woman creates, can a battered woman's state of mind be
accurately and fairly understood."); see also Lenkevich, supra note 9, at 308-09.
109. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 375.
110. Id. at 370; see Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-
Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP.
195, 211-12 (1986); Legal Responses, supra note 98, at 1580.
111. See Parrish, supra note 5, at 83.
112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (LexisNexis 2006).
113. Id.
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If a person is charged with an offense involving the use of force
against another and the person, as a defense to the offense charged,
raises the affirmative defense of self-defense, the person may intro-
duce expert testimony of the "battered woman syndrome" and expert
testimony that the person suffered from that syndrome as evidence
to establish the requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or
great bodily harm that is necessary, as an element of the affirmative
defense, to justify the person's use of the force in question." 4
Even if we ignore the substance of the studies, cases, and laws
described above, their mere existence undermines a core justifica-
tion for the Supreme Court of Virginia's Stamper principle. As
stated in Stamper and reaffirmed in Peeples, the court believes
that psychological evidence "is not sufficiently stable and estab-
lished," to be admissible."' But arguably, with the development of
BWS research and the recognition by several states that its exist-
ence is "commonly accepted scientific knowledge," the argument
that the state of psychiatry is insufficient to support the admis-
sion of BWS evidence becomes tenuous."' To reiterate, this re-
form does not advocate for experts to testify on the ultimate issue
of fact, rather it argues that expert testimony will appropriately
educate the jury as to a reasonable fear within the context of the
abusive relationship.
Despite many states and courts accepting the legitimacy of
BWS, critics still challenge it."' But such criticism only supports
the need for expert testimony because it highlights the wide-
spread misunderstandings regarding the disorder. In referring to
BWS as an "abuse excuse,""' many critics argue that even if BWS
does exist, it still fails to explain why some abuse victims kill
their abusers."' Such arguments are often misled by the use of
the term "helplessness" in learned helplessness. Furthermore,
these arguments fail to adequately examine the role that learned
114. Id.
115. Peeples v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 626, 631, 519 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1999); see
supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
116. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (LexisNexis 2006).
117. Parrish, supra note 5, at 83.
118. Alan M. Dershowitz, Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal
System?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 775, 775 (2000) (book review); see also Lenkevich, supra
note 9, at 301 (citing ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS,
SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1994) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ, THE
ABUSE EXCUSE]).
119. Dershowitz, supra note 118, at 778.
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helplessness plays in forming a woman's behavior within an abu-
sive relationship. For example, Alan Dershowitz argues that
"[t]he act of killing is not a symptom of the battered woman syn-
drome. Indeed, it is largely inconsistent with the characteristic
symptoms of passivity."120 As already addressed in Part I, while a
woman suffering from BWS may exhibit passive behavior, passive
behavior is not a defining characteristic of BWS.'" This criticism
reflects the commonly held misconceptions regarding BWS and
learned helplessness. Importantly, BWS is not an excuse, rather
the victim defendant still bears the burden of showing that she
had a reasonable fear of imminent harm or death. Admitting ex-
pert testimony about BWS simply frames the issue under a sub-
jective standard; it does not extinguish her burden of proof.
Of course, expert testimony can work for both the prosecution
and the defense; it is not a defendant-only evidentiary tool. If
Virginia admits expert testimony in order to assist fact-finders in
evaluating the victim defendant's mental state, the Common-
wealth will also be allowed to admit evidence to the contrary. For
example, in Wyoming, BWS is statutorily defined and expert tes-
timony is admissible to show that the defendant suffers from
BWS and "to establish the necessary requisite belief of an immi-
nent danger of death or great bodily harm as an element of the
affirmative defense, to justify the person's use of force." 122 In Ben-
jamin v. State, a defendant argued that she suffered from BWS."
However, the prosecution admitted testimony to the contrary and
effectively demonstrated, through the use of expert testimony,
that the defendant did not suffer from BWS.124 Moreover, while
BWS is a product of abuse, not all abuse victims suffer from
BWS.125 Therefore, a prosecutor may wish to admit expert testi-
mony in order to show that while the deceased abused the de-
fendant, the defendant was not suffering from BWS. Lastly, BWS
is a psychological disorder; it is not legal defense in and of itself.126
120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
122. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203 (2013).
123. 264 P.3d 1, 7 (Wyo. 2011).
124. See id. at 6-7 (". . . State offered testimony indicating that Ms. Benjamin was ac-
tually the aggressor in the relationship.").
125. See generally WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 6, at xv (explaining
that a woman must suffer abuse at least twice to become a battered woman).
126. State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1148-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
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A Maryland court, making this subtle yet significant distinction,
clarified that a defendant must show that the "syndrome evidence
would ... explain[] ... in light of that pattern of abuse, [how] the
defendant could honestly, and perhaps reasonably, perceive an
imminent threat of immediate danger."' Thus, BWS is not a de-
fense; rather it only has a "bearing, in a given case, on the state of
mind element of the defenses of perfect and imperfect self-
defense."" Clearly, expert testimony can both support and coun-
ter claims of BWS. The purpose of expert testimony is to educate
the jury, hence expert testimony can support both the defendant's
and the prosecution's theory of the case.
Lastly, while it is the courts that apply evidentiary rules relat-
ing to expert testimony, reform should occur at the legislative
level. Several circuit courts have already admitted expert testi-
mony on the issue. Therefore, in order to provide uniform change,
reform must happen at the top.
B. Extend the Subjective Standard of Reasonable Fear to Overt
Act
The previous section discussed reforming the rules regarding
expert testimony, thereby giving a victim defendant an adequate
opportunity to argue that her fear was reasonable pursuant to
Virginia self-defense laws. However, under the current law rea-
sonable fear alone is insufficient to claim self-defense; a victim
defendant must also show that her fear was in response to the de-
ceased's overt act.'29 Therefore, in tandem with this reform is the
need to reform the objective overt act requirement to permit the
fact-finder to consider overt acts through the eyes of the victim
defendant. This section examines the need for reforms in light of
the symptoms of BWS. The need for this reform is further evinced
through a comparison of two Virginia cases that illustrate how a
failure to extend a subjective standard to the overt act require-
ment frustrates the overall purpose of self-defense laws and leads
to absurd results.
127. Id. at 1150.
128. Id. at 1148-49.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67, 77-79.
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The overt act requires a defendant claiming self-defense to
show that the deceased committed an act, which then triggered
the defendant's reasonable fear.3 o Specifically, the overt act must
be "indicative of imminent danger at the time.""' Virginia recog-
nizes that an individual has the right to defend herself, even
when there is no objectively real danger, so long as she reasona-
bly perceived a danger. Yet, the courts still require some "trigger"
responsible for the defendant's fear. It is this trigger or overt act,
that has "effectively seal[ed] the fate of battered women claiming
self-defense."'3 2 Unlike the reasonable fear standard, the court
will consider the existence of an overt act under an objective
standard.' The Virginia courts have not altered the objective
overt act requirement. Often, a court's determination as to the ex-
istence of an overt act will turn on the temporal nexus between
the overt act and the killing, whereby if too much time has
elapsed between the overt act and the killing, the victim defend-
ant cannot claim self-defense.'
Consequently, as the overt act requirement currently stands, it
is incompatible with the realities of BWS and the cycle of violence
from which BWS emerges. As mentioned in Part I, BWS is asso-
ciated with a continuous cycle of violence characterized by three
stages: tension-building, acute abuse, and forgiveness.'"' Because
the cycle of violence, in essence, provides the victim with a fore-
cast of her partner's abusive behavior, she is able to interpret
each act, whether neutral or aggressive, as an indicator of future
violence. Thus, given the victim defendant's "intimate knowledge
of her batterer," she will become acutely aware of when an esca-
lated violent episode will occur.' Importantly, not only will the
cycle of violence impact a victim defendant's perception, but the
130. See Vlastaris v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 647, 651-52, 178 S.E. 775, 776 (1935).
131. Id. at 652, 178 S.E. at 776.
132. Lenkevich, supra note 9, at 304.
133. See Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729, 553 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2001).
134. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577-78 (Kan. 1988). The defendant, Peg-
gy Stewart, shot her husband while he was sleeping. Id. at 574. The court reasoned that
"[t]he perceived imminent danger had to occur in the present time, specifically during the
time in which the defendant and the deceased were engaged in their final conflict." Id. at
577. Accordingly, the court held that no overt act existed. Id. at 579; see also State v. Nor-
man, 366 S.E.2d 586, 590-91 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (emphasizing the need for an overt act
for a finding of objective reasonableness).
135. Jacobsen et al., supra note 17, at 38.
136. See, e.g., Betchel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
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symptoms of BWS may also affect a victim defendant's perception
regarding her abuser's behavior. For example, during the tension-
building stage, a victim may show signs of hypervigilance, where-
by the victim will "develop[] a heightened sensitivity to any kinds
of cues of distress."13' Accordingly, the cycle of violence paired
with specific BWS symptoms can significantly alter the victim de-
fendant's perception. As a result, neutral acts can become signs of
aggression to the extent that no single act committed by the
abuser is void of meaning. In the eyes of a woman suffering from
BWS, all acts relate back to the abuse.' In essence, the relation-
ship itself becomes an overt act of violence producing a reasona-
ble fear."' The following two cases illustrate how Virginia's cur-
rent failure to extend the subjective standard produces absurd
results.
1. Commonwealth v. Sands
In Commonwealth v. Sands, Victoria Shelton Sands ("Sands")
shot her husband, Thomas Lee Sands ("Thomas"), five times
while he lay in bed watching television.o The facts of Sands are
disturbing. Thomas physically and verbally abused Sands for
years.'41 On August 23, 1998, the day of the shooting, a neighbor
witnessed Thomas throw Sands down concrete steps.14 1 While on
the ground, Thomas sat on top of Sands and fired a gun shot into
the ground next to her head."' As the day progressed, Thomas
"drank beer [and] used cocaine." 14 ' He would "intermittently
watch television in the bedroom," then "return[] to the assault
upon his wife.""' Thomas threatened Sands that day, stating,
"you will die, I promise you, you will die.""' Sands' sister-in-law,
who was at the house before the shooting, testified that "[she]
137. Id.
138. See Kinports, supra note 40, at 174-75.
139. See id.; see also Terrance et al., supra note 35, at 938 ("As the cycle of abuse con-
tinues to establish itself within the relationship, the victim learns to predict both the
probable period and severity of the ensuing abusive incident.")
140. 262 Va. 724, 728, 553 S.E.2d 733, 734-35 (2001).
141. Id. at 726, 553 S.E.2d at 734.
142. Id. at 727, 553 S.E.2d at 735.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Sands v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 669, 674, 536 S.E.2d 461, 463 (2000).
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helped the defendant pull up her shirt. Upon seeing her injuries,
the defendant 'started shaking really, really bad, and her eyes got
real wild eyed.""4 Soon after, Sands retrieved the gun from a cab-
inet, went to the bathroom, shot Thomas, and then called 911.148
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that imminent
danger does not mean immediate danger.'4 ' Furthermore, the
court held that "[t]he evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to [Sands], supports a finding that [Sands] both did believe and
reasonably could have believed she was in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily harm."',0 The court, in reaching its hold-
ing, relied on the overall pattern of severe violence committed by
Thomas against Sands, and the specific threat issued that day."'
Accordingly, the court stated, "[Sands] was without fault in be-
ginning the altercation, reasonably apprehended she was in im-
minent danger of death or serious bodily harm and, thus, was jus-
tified in shooting her husband to prevent him from killing her or
further inflicting serious bodily harm upon her.""2
The case went to the Supreme Court of Virginia on the issue of
whether Sands could claim self-defense."' The court, adhering to
a narrow interpretation of "imminent danger," held that Sands
failed to establish a claim of self-defense and reversed the court of
appeals' decision." The court's analysis turned on the events
leading up to the shooting, specifically the time it took for these
events to unfold. In response, it held that enough time elapsed
between the last assault and the shooting to bar a claim of self-
defense."' As supporting evidence, the court relied heavily on the
fact that, although only an hour had elapsed, it was sufficient
time for the sister-in-law to arrive and assist Sands in undress-
ing."6 The court stated:
147. Sands, 262 Va. at 728, 553 S.E.2d at 735.
148. Id., 553 S.E.2d at 735-36.
149. Sands, 33 Va. App. at 678-79, 536 S.E.2d at 465.
150. Id. at 679-80, 536 S.E.2d at 466.
151. Id. at 679, 536 S.E.2d at 465.
152. Sands, 262 Va. at 730, 553 S.E.2d at 737.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 730-31, 553 S.E.2d at 736-37.
155. Id. at 730, 553 S.E.2d at 737.
156. Although the court never fully addressed the presence of the sister-in-law, the
court determined that because Sands had time to call her and she had time to arrive be-
fore the shooting, enough time had elapsed to disqualify the previous assault as an overt
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[w]hile we do not doubt the defendant's genuine fear for her life or
minimize the atrocities inflicted upon her, we cannot point to any ev-
idence of an overt act indicating imminent danger, or indeed any act
at all by her husband, when she shot him five times while he re-
clined on the bed.1 57
Accordingly, the court refused to allow for a claim of self-defense
because the defendant had not established the requisite overt act
by the deceased.
2. Commonwealth v. Cary
In comparing the facts and outcome in Sands with the court's
holding and reasoning in Commonwealth v. Cary, the absurdity of
an objective overt act standard becomes markedly clear. In Cary,
the defendant Rebecca Scarlett Cary and the deceased Mark
Beekman had been in a "tumultuous" relationship for fifteen
years.' The Supreme Court of Virginia characterized the rela-
tionship as having "a long history of acts of violence committed by
the male upon the female that were frequently occasioned by the
excessive use by the male of alcohol and illicit drugs."" The cou-
ple was separated, yet continued to argue over child-support
payments. 0 On May 23, 2002, Cary purchased a handgun be-
cause, as she testified, she wanted "to protect [herself and her]
children and [their] home."" Several months later, Cary allegedly
told Beekman's sister that she had purchased the handgun to
threaten Beekman if he did not pay child support, suggesting that
perhaps Cary was not as fearful as she claimed.'62 At trial, Cary
denied these statements.' On September 6, 2002, Beekman went
to Cary's apartment and the two proceeded to argue over child-
support payments." ' C ary reported that Beekman smelled like al-
act. See id. at 730-31, 553 S.E.2d at 737.
157. Id. at 730, 553 S.E.2d at 737.
158. 271 Va. 87, 90-91, 623 S.E.2d 906, 907 (2006).
159. Id. at 100, 623 S.E.2d at 913. The court noted the severity of Beekman's abuse,
recognizing that, "[Beekman] had beaten [Cary] with his fists on numerous prior occasions
and, on one occasion, broke a glass in her face. [Cary] testified that, prior to the night on
which she shot the victim, he had beaten her as recently as the previous weekend." Id. at
95, 623 S.E.2d at 910.
160. Id. at 91, 623 S.E.2d at 907.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id., 623 S.E.2d at 907-08.
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cohol.'' When Beekman went to the bathroom, Cary retrieved her
gun.' Then, "Beekman came out of the bathroom .... Beekman
again refused to leave the home and 'was still verbally assaulting'
Cary, threatening that he would 'smack' her, "'F' [her] up', and
'break [her] up.""67 At that point Cary pointed the gun and shot
Beekman.6 8
A jury convicted Cary; however, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia reversed.' The court of appeals held that Cary produced suffi-
cient evidence to claim self-defense.' Specifically, in reference to
the overt act requirement, the court of appeals stated:
Beekman's actions immediately prior to the shooting ... established
an overt act of sufficient imminence to entitle her to a self-defense
instruction because it supported a finding that the victim, although
still over ten feet away, was advancing toward her in a threatening
fashion to resume the attack he had stopped only moments earlier.
Importantly, the supreme court agreed for the following rea-
sons. First, Cary had told Beekman to leave her house after he
emerged from the bathroom; however, he refused.'72 Second, at
that time Beekman threatened Cary with an act of violence."'
Third, at the exact time of the shooting, Beekman was "'walking
or running"' towards Cary."' For these reasons, the supreme
court affirmed the decision.'
In both cases, the courts considered the alleged overt acts un-
der an objective standard and the inequity of the results is easily
observed. Each woman's perception was irrelevant to the court's
165. Id. Beekman's autopsy revealed the presence of both alcohol and cocaine in his
system. Id., 623 S.E.2d at 908. The court acknowledged that the deceased had a history of
substance abuse. Id. at 100, 623 S.E.2d at 913.
166. Id. at 91, 623 S.E.2d at 908.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 91-92, 623 S.E.2d at 908. Cary then instructed her son to canll 911 and
dragged Beekman out into the apartment hallway. Id. at 92, 623 S.E.2d at 908. When
asked why she dragged Beekman out, she stated that she thought it would allow emergen-
cy services to get to the body sooner. Id. When emergency services arrived, Beekman was
dead. Id.
169. Id. at 94-95, 623 S.E.2d at 909-10.
170. Id. at 95, 623 S.E.2d at 910.
171. Id. (quoting Cary v. Commonwealth, No. 2031-03-1, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 623, at
*14 (Dec. 21, 2004) (unpublished decision)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Id. at 101, 623 S.E.2d at 914.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 90, 101, 623 S.E.2d at 907, 914.
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analysis. Rather, the judges, in determining whether each de-
fendant had established an overt act sufficient to claim self-
defense, viewed the events and actions through their own per-
spectives, typically a reasonable proxy for a reasonable person's
perspective. However, as a result, Sands went to prison, and Cary
went home.176 As already stated, the difference between these re-
sults is manifestly unjust because both women were in violent
situations that posed a probable threat to their lives. Arguably,
the threat of imminent bodily harm or death existed for both
women. If, however, the courts had applied a subjective standard
to overt acts, the likelihood that each court would have appropri-
ately sentenced each defendant would undoubtedly have been
greater.
The courts in Sands and Cary focused on the timing of the
shootings relative to the last assault."7 Under this proposed re-
form, this temporal nexus between the deceased's overt act and
the killing would remain intact. Accordingly, a subjective stand-
ard would not amount to an open invitation for courts to consider
any and all acts on behalf of the deceased. Rather, a subjective
standard would still limit the court's analysis to conduct that oc-
curred within a reasonable time before the killing. Thus, for ex-
ample, a victim defendant could not rely on a beating from two
days ago as proof of an overt act thereby justifying her use of
deadly force without more evidence.
Comparatively, some scholars have advocated for a complete
elimination of the requirement for imminent harm."' While the
element required for a valid self-defense claim is imminent harm,
and not immediate harm, courts will often conflate the two terms
and require temporal proximity as part of the victim defendant's
prima facie case for self-defense."' However, scholars and reform-
ers have been critical of the imminent requirement for a variety
of reasons that go beyond arguing that a temporal nexus re-
quirement is erroneous against an imminent harm requirement.
For example, some argue that the imminent requirement reflects
176. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57, 169-71.
177. See Cary, 271 Va. at 101, 623 S.E.2d at 913; Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va.
724, 730, 553 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2001).
178. Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 449 (1991).
179. Terrance et al., supra note 35, at 927-28.
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a "male-centered" self-defense criteria because it assumes a face-
to-face confrontation to be necessary for a valid self-defense
claim."'o These reformers argue that this assumption is more
characteristic of a man's claim of self-defense.' Furthermore,
under this criticism, the imminence requirement, meaning a face-
to-face confrontation, fails to "account [for] the cumulative effects
of repeated violence, or the prediction of violence in the future."'82
Other scholars argue that requiring temporal proximity between
the act and the killing forces self-defense law to deviate from its
necessity-based origins."' These critiques are valid; however, the
reform that this comment proposes does not go so far as to elimi-
nate the imminent harm requirement, nor does it seek to reverse
precedent that turns on temporal proximity between the overt act
and the killing. Rather this reform, by allowing the court to con-
sider the deceased's behavior through the eyes of a woman suffer-
ing from BWS, would expand the types of acts that the court
could consider and not the timing of an overt act.
The need to consider both aggressive and neutral acts embrac-
es the role that the cycle of violence plays within the abusive rela-
tionship and its effect on a woman suffering from BWS. Within
this cycle of violence, an overt act is constantly present because a
victim learns to link nonviolent behaviors to violent outbursts."'
Therefore, if the law were to require courts to consider an overt
act under a subjective standard, then the court's analysis would
appropriately align with the known realities of domestic abuse
and the manner in which it can modify a victim's perceptions. A
woman trapped in a cycle of abuse may view one beating as part
of a single, on-going assault.'' As the court in Sands acknowl-
edged, on the day of the shooting, Thomas would "intermittently
watch television in the bedroom for short periods of time, but al-
180. Id. at 927.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Erica Beecher-Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in
the Law of Evidence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 81, 100-02 (2001) ("Limiting necessity to the tem-
poral element ignores the problem of absent alternatives. If there really is no escape, or if
the accused reasonably perceives that there is none, and it is only a matter of time until
the abuser will kill, then insisting on a temporal necessity seems rather beside the point of
survival.").
184. See supra notes 40-42.
185. See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 1, at 105-06.
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ways returned to the assault upon his wife.""' Arguably, from
Sands' perspective, the assault was not over. The fact that an
hour had elapsed since the last assault is irrelevant because she
reasonably believed that another assault was imminent.187 Ac-
cordingly, if the Sands court evaluated the overt act from this
perspective, one shadowed in a cycle of violence, the existence of
an overt act could be proven. Interestingly, the court in Cary,
while refusing to acknowledge the prior assault as an overt act,
did state, "Cary cannot rely solely on the initial assault upon her
as the 'overt act' that occasioned her resort to self-defense. How-
ever, ... neither may we disregard that evidence entirely."
Thus, by refusing to "disregard [it] entirely," the court clearly un-
derstood that such evidence of violence is relevant and was will-
ing to evaluate the defendant's self-defense claim given such evi-
dence.'" Moreover, under a subjective standard, a court would be
permitted to consider the deceased's words and actions against
the deceased's proven history of violent and aggressive behavior.
Consequently, a court could determine that seemingly harmless
behavior, such as the deceased's use of drugs and alcohol, equated
to an overt act in the mind of the victim defendant.
The Sands and Cary court ignored one of the most significant
facts: the abusive nature of the relationships and how the vio-
lence altered the victim defendants' states of mind.' Instead, the
courts, through a limited analysis, only focused on events arising
from an arbitrary time period before the shooting. If the purpose
of a self-defense law is to allow an individual to protect himself or
herself from imminent harm, the courts cannot be inflexible in
their analysis to the extent of producing inconsistent results. Ra-
ther self-defense laws must be tailored to address the specific cir-
cumstances of domestic abuse and BWS.
Coincidently, Virginia courts recognize that the deceased's be-
havior is relevant to a claim of self-defense because such evidence
is relevant to show how the defendant may or may not have per-
ceived the deceased. Once a claim of self-defense is raised, the de-
fendant can offer evidence of "specific acts . .. to show the charac-
186. Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 727, 553 S.E.2d 733, 735 (2001).
187. Id. at 727-28, 553 S.E.2d at 735.
188. Commonwealth v. Cary, 271 Va. 87, 101, 623 S.E.2d 906, 913 (2006).
189. Id.
190. See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 1, at 50.
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ter of the victim for turbulence and violence.""' Thus, the court
understands that showing how the defendant viewed the de-
ceased is relevant to a claim of self-defense.192 However, the court
still requires an overt act before such evidence can be admitted,
and only once the defendant has established a prima facie case
for self-defense. Unfortunately, in the case of BWS, a victim de-
fendant does not have the opportunity to admit evidence of an
overt act, because her perception of an overt act may not mirror
the perception of a "reasonable" person.
CONCLUSION
Virginia's self-defense laws are an acknowledgment that not all
acts of violence should be punished. When a person fears for his
or her life as a result of another's actions, then he or she, out of
necessity, is allowed to use force to survive. Our society, specifi-
cally our legal system, believes that an individual should be al-
lowed to protect himself from death or severe bodily harm. Yet, as
the law stands today in Virginia, not everyone has this right.
In reality, a woman trapped in a violent relationship may not
be able to effectively defend herself, despite fearing for her life.
An abusive relationship can change normal human behavior.
Moreover, it can lead to contradictions within normal, accepted
social interactions. BWS evinces such a contradiction. BWS ex-
plains how seemingly abnormal behavior on behalf of the victim
is in fact the victim's attempt at survival. She learns to behave in
a manner that reduces violence and increases predictability. Im-
portantly, she can perceive aggressive acts in otherwise neutral
behaviors. However, BWS does not erase the instinct to self-
defend.
Unfortunately, if a woman suffering from BWS does defend
herself through force, she may find that the law, albeit apologetic
for the abuse she has endured, is unwilling to allow for an effec-
tive defense. Accordingly, this comment proposes two reforms
that would attempt to restore an abuse victim's right to self-
defense. These proposals are not intended to give women an
191. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 852, 855, 252 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1979).
192. Id. In Jordan, the court held that there was no valid claim of self-defense. Id.
Therefore, the deceased's previous acts, specifically "confrontations" between the defend-
ant and the deceased, were inadmissible. Id.
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"abuse excuse," nor are these reforms intended to give an abuse-
victim defendant an extra defense beyond what the law already
provides.'" Rather, these reforms would permit defendants to put
on evidence to show that self-defense is an appropriate and legal-
ly permissible option. The defendant's fate will still reside in the
hands of the fact-finder. The law already recognizes a person's
right to self-defend; therefore, the law must fully embrace this
notion. Incorporating these reforms will do just that.
From the outset, Dr. Walker underscored the need for juries to
be fully informed of the psychological effects of domestic abuse.
She recognized that,
[u]nless a jury is allowed to understand the bearing that learned be-
havior patterns have in determining the actions of battered wom-
en . . . they may find themselves at a loss in attempting to deliver a
reasonable and just verdict. And the battered woman, victimized by
her man, runs the risk of being victimized yet again by an uncom-
prehending legal system.19 4
While many states have heeded Dr. Walker's urgings, Virginia
has not, and unless the aforementioned reforms are adopted, Vir-
ginia courts will continue to operate as an "uncomprehending le-
gal system.""
The effects of domestic violence permeate our criminal justice
system and until we fully acknowledge these effects and appro-
priately consider such effects at sentencing, the current gap be-
tween culpability and punishment will remain.
Just recently, a California court freed Mary Virginia Jones af-
ter she served thirty-two years for first-degree murder, kidnap-
ping, and robbery.'" Her lawyers argued that, "she would not
have been convicted if the jury had heard expert testimony about
the impact of intimate partner battering."' After an independent
investigation, the State agreed to accept a plea of no contest for
involuntary manslaughter, which carries with it an eleven-year
193. See generally DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE, supra note 118, at 3 (defining
"abuse excuse" as "the legal tactic by which criminal defendants claim a history of abuse
as an excuse for violent retaliation").
194. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 1, at 53.
195. Id.
196. Mary Virginia Jones Released from Prison after 32 Years, ABC7 (Mar. 25, 2014,
12:00 AM), http://abc7.comlarchive/9478961/.
197. Id.
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maximum sentence."' As Superior Court Judge William Ryan
highlighted, Jones effectively served 11,875 days, in excess of her
sentence."' Her punishment far outweighed her culpability. By
adopting the proposed reforms, Virginia can prevent the same
from happening in the Commonwealth
Kendall Hamilton *
198. Id.
199. Id.
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